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On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of
Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration
Awards
Lisa B. Bingham*
This coming year celebrates the 25th anniversary of Professor Marc Galanter's
article on the limits of legal change.' In an extensive survey of literature about
litigation and dispute settlement from a broad range of disciplines, he suggests that
built-in advantages in the legal system can best be identified and understood
through an analysis of elements including rules, institutional facilities, lawyers, and
parties. His typology of parties divides actors into the categories of repeat players
(RPs) and one-shotters (OS).2 Repeat players have frequent recourse to the courts
or institutional facilities, while one-shotters will have few such occasions. He
identifies a collection of advantages repeat players will generally enjoy over one-
shotters, including: (1) experience leading to changes in how the repeat player
structures the next similar transaction; (2) expertise, economies of scale, and access
to specialist advocates; (3) informal continuing relationships with institutional
incumbents; (4) reputation and credibility in bargaining; (5) long-term strategies
facilitating risk-taking in appropriate cases; (6) influence over rules through
lobbying and other use of resources; (7) playing for precedent and favorable future
rules; (8) distinguishing symbolic and actual defeats; and (9) resources invested in
getting rules favorable to them implemented.
One-shotters: (1) have more at stake in a given case; (2) are more risk averse;
(3) are more interested in immediate over long-term gain; (4) are less interested in
precedent and favorable rules; (5) are not able to form continuing relationships with
courts or institutional representatives; (6) cannot use the experience to structure
future similar transactions; and (7) have limited access to specialist advocates.
* Lisa B. Bingham is Assistant Professor of Public and Environmental Affairs, and Co-Director of the
Indiana Conflict Resolution Institute at Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana; B.A. 1976 Smith College; J.D.
1979 University of Connecticut School of Law. A former partner in the labor and employment law department of
Shipman & Goodwin, Hartford, Connecticut, she is an arbitrator on the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
Labor Panel, and the American Arbitration Association Labor Arbitration and Employment Dispute Resolution
Panels. This Article is an outgrowth ofa Symposium on Contractual Arbitration, April 19, 1997, sponsored by the
McGeorge School of Law. The author wishes to acknowledge the research assistance of Christine Clark-Trevino,
J.DJM.P.A. candidate at Indiana University. In addition, the author thanks Professor Alan S. Rau and all the
participants in the McGeorge Symposium for deepening her understanding of issues in judicial review of arbitration
awards, and George Friedman and the American Arbitration Association for making available the materials for this
study, and for helpful comments on the manuscript. The opinions expressed here are those of the author.
1. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAw
& SOcVY REV. 95 (1974).
2. Id. at 97.
3. Id. at 98-103.
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Galanter observed that most litigation is brought by repeat player plaintiffs
against one-shotter defendants (landlord-tenant, creditor-debtor, prosecutor-accused
criminal, and IRS-taxpayer being salient examples).' The one-shotter plaintiff
against the repeat player defendant was, at the time of his writing, comparatively
infrequent (and included personal injury, for example).' A recent and accelerating
development has been the use of arbitration for non-union employment disputes.
6
In these cases, a one-shotter plaintiff, the employee, brings suit against a repeat
player defendant, the employer, usually on claims of prohibited discrimination in
employment, wrongful dismissal, or breach of contract. Analogous uses of
arbitration are arising in the products liability area in connection with warranties on
consumer purchases and medical malpractice, and in consumer banking and credit
disputes.
This Article empirically examines the repeat player employer and the use of
personnel manuals, one form of contract of adhesion, in employment arbitration.
First, it briefly reviews some of the salient cases that allow for the imposition of
arbitration through an adhesive employment contract. Second, it summarizes prior
empirical research on employment arbitration. Third, it reports the results of an
empirical study on the repeat player effect as it relates to the presence of a per-
sonnel manual or handbook as the basis for arbitration. That study finds that repeat
player employers do better in arbitration than one-shotters, and that employers
arbitrating pursuant to a personnel manual do better than those arbitrating under an
individual contract. Thus, adhesive contracts do put employees at a disadvantage.
Fourth, the article examines some of the accounts for the repeat player effect in
light of Galanter's catalogue of advantages. Lastly, it discusses ways empirical
analysis of arbitration awards should, and should not, be used in the judicial review
of employment arbitration awards in light of the repeat player effect. It argues that
statistics on an arbitrator's past record should not be used in judicial review for
actual active bias of the arbitrator. However, undisclosed prior cases with the same
employer are relevant evidence on the question of the reasonable appearance of
arbitrator bias. Finally, statistical analysis on the set of cases decided under certain
arbitration rules or protocols may be helpful in examining structural bias.
4. Id. at 109-10.
5. Id. at 110.
6. For a more detailed review of some of the empirical literature, see Lisa B. Bingham, Employment
Arbitration: The Repeat PlayerEffect, 1 EMPLOYEERTS. &EMPLOYMENTPOL'YJ. 301 (1997). For a critical review
of the empirical support for claims that alternative dispute resolution is superior to the civil justice system for
resolving disputes, see Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle:" Judicial Promotion a,,d Regulation of
Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339 (1994).
7. For a more detailed review, see Jean R. Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the
Supreme Court's Preference For Binding Arbitration, 74 WAsH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996).
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I. EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION AND ADHESIVE CONTRACTS
The quickly evolving field of employment arbitration is presenting substantial
challenges to the courts and policy-makers. The use of employment arbitration
began to accelerate dramatically after the United State Supreme Court decided
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation. In Gilmer, a registered securities
representative sued his employer, alleging prohibited age discrimination. The
employer moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreement in the
securities registration application. The U.S. Supreme Court held that parties may
agree to determine statutory claims in an enforceable arbitration agreement under
the Federal Arbitration Act. The employee had the burden of proving that Congress
intended to forbid employees from waiving their rights to a court trial for statutory
claims. The plaintiff alleged bias in the arbitration panel under the New York Stock
Exchange arbitration rules, and argued that the lack of a written award precluded
effective judicial review. Nevertheless, the Court enforced the arbitration
agreement.
An increasing number of courts have followed this lead. 8 In the employment
setting, a predispute arbitration agreement may be an adhesive contract, that is, one
that is the product of unequal bargaining power presented to the other party on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis and nevertheless, be enforceable.9 Most courts conclude that
an employee who does not wish to accept this condition of employment may simply
seek employment elsewhere. 10 There are parallel developments on the state court
8. See Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1344, 1345 n.5 (1997) (observing that the District of Columbia, and the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
and Eighth Circuits have followed Gilmer).
9. For reviews of the case law and analysis pro and con, see e.g., Paul D. Carrington and Paul H. Haagen,
Contract andJurisdiction, 8 SuP. Cr. REV. 331 (1996); Sarah R. Cole, Incentives andArbitration: the Case Against
Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449
(1996); Estreicher, supra note 8, at 1344; David E. Feller, Fender Bender or Train Wreck?: The Collision Between
Statutory Protection of Individual Employee Rights and the Judicial Revision of the Federal Arbitration Act, 41
ST. LOUiS U. LJ. 561 (1997); Walter J. Gershenfeld, Pre-Employment Dispute Arbitration Agreements: Yes, No
andMaybe, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L. J. 245 (1996); Richard C. Reuben, The Dark Side ofADR, CAL LAW., Feb. 1994,
at 53; Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 TUL L. REV. 1377 (1991); Stephen J. Ware,
Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSIRA L. REV. 83 (1996); e.g., Beauchamp v. Great West
Life Assurance Co., 918 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (holding that contracts of adhesion, characterized by
standardized forms prepared by one party, offered for acceptance or rejection without opportunity for bargaining,
are enforceable if substantially reasonable and not oppressive or unconscionable, and citing Gilmer for the
proposition that fraud or overwhelming economic power could provide grounds for the revocation of an agreement
to arbitrate). For an examination of adhesive arbitration agreements in international arbitration, see Alan S. Rau,
The New York Convention in American Courts, 7 AM. REV. OF INT'L ARB. 213 (1996).
10. See, e.g., Cremin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460 (N.D. Il1. 1997)
(holding registered securities representative knowingly consented to arbitrate employment disputes when she
acquiesced in New York Stock Exchange and National Association of Securities Dealers registration containing
mandatory arbitration requirements, and rejecting due process claims); Cular v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 961 F.
Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (enforcing arbitration agreement which insurance sales representatives were required
to sign as a condition of their employment through completion of securities industries registration statement);
Dempsey v. George S. May Int'l Co., 933 F. Supp. 72 (D. Mass. 1996) (holding arbitration agreement had adequate
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level."' As a practical matter, this leaves employers free to structure the employment
consideration and was enforceable where the consideration for the employer's promise to arbitrate was the em-
ployee's similarpromise, notwithstanding the fact that the arbitration agreement had been imposed after employee
worked some years for company); Golenia v. Bob BakerToyota, 915 F. Supp. 201 (S.D. Calif. 1996) (compelling
arbitration of Americans with Disabilities Act claims under agreement found in Employee Handbook and form
entitled "Employee Acknowledgment of Receipt of Arbitration Policy" together with employment agreement that
was part of job application process); Maye v. Smith Barney, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (enforcing
arbitration agreement found in documents entitled "Principles of Employment" that were completed as part of the
application process, and requiring employees to agree to arbitration policy which was available for review upon
request); see also e.g. Rogers v. Brown, __ F. Supp. -, 1997 WL 789501 (M.D. La. 1997) (deciding that
arbitration clause contained in employment application was enforceable because employee could have avoided the
clause by simply rejecting employment, and thus there was no difference in bargaining position between employer
and employee); Kelly v. UHC Management Co., 967 F. Supp. 1240 (N.D. Ala. 1997) (holding that, even if
arbitration agreements are adhesive, and they are offered on a take it or leave it basis with no opportunity for
bargaining, they are enforceable as there is nothing inherently unfair or oppressive about arbitration clauses);
Shellerv. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, 957 F. Supp. 150 (N.D. 111. 1997) (compelling arbitration of sexual harassment
claims when agreement was signed by minor as part of ajob application, and refusing to permit minors to disaffirm
arbitration agreement under Illinois infancy law); Topf v. Warnaco, Inc., 942 F. Supp. 762 (D. Conn. 1996)
(compelling arbitration ofemployment claims andrejecting fraudulent inducement claims that employer represented
that all "key" terms were in offer letter signed by employee, while only "general" terms were in employee hand-
book, where arbitration clause was in handbook).
11. See, e.g., Austin v. U.S. West, Inc., 926 P.2d 181 (Colo. App. 1996) (holding that wives' claims of
fraudulent inducement to enter employment in Russia within scope of arbitration clause in contract signed by
husbands); Saltzman v. Travelers, Inc., 1996 WL24650 (Conn. Super. 1996) (finding arbitration clause in securities
registration application enforceable notwithstanding claims it is a contract of adhesion); Brown v. KFC Nat'l
Management Co., 921 P.2d 146 (Haw. 1996) (finding that arbitration agreement contained in employment
application covered all claims regarding employment, and enforceable even though not contained in employment
contract); Int'l Creative Management v. D & R Entertainment Co., 670 N.E.2d 1305 (Ind. App. 1996) (determining
arbitration provision of written contract to perform concert enforceable even though musician did not sign contract
because musician came to perform show pursuant to contract); Freeman v. Minolta Business Systems, 699 So. 2d
1182 (La. App. 1997) (finding employment contract containing arbitration clause enforceable as to sexual
harassment claim and question of whether employment contract invalid because adhesionary and procured through
fraud is for arbitrator to decide); Wied v. TRCM, LLC, 698 So. 2d 685 (La. App. 1997) (enforcing arbitration
clause in employment agreement assuming, for the sake of argument, that the non-competition clause was
unenforceable, the violation of which employer sought arbitration to remedy); Grote v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 682 So. 2d 926 (La. App. 1996) (concluding arbitration clause contained in securities
industry registration application enforceable as to employees' claims for wages); Johnson v. PiperJaffray, Inc., 530
N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 1995) (noting employee's state law age and sex discrimination claims against employer must
be arbitrated, since FAA preempts contrary statelaw, and arbitration agreement in securities registration application
is enforceable under FAA); Bleumer v. Parkway Ins. Co., 649 A.2d 913 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1994) (holding that claims
under state whistleblower statute governed by arbitration clause in employment contract under Federal Arbitration
Act and subject to compulsory arbitration); Young v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 688 A.2d 1069 (N.J. Super.
1997) (holding claims under state whistleblower and discrimination laws arbitrable under securities registration
statement); Gunby v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 1997 WL 634530 (Tenn. App. 1997)
(enforcing arbitration of sexual discrimination and harassment claims under securities registration application); BWI
Companies, Inc. v. Beck, 910 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. App. 1995) (enforcing arbitration agreement with respect to
employee's claims of retaliatory discharge). But see, e.g., Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 5 Cal. App. 4th 1519, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 138 (1997) (determining arbitration clause unenforceable because it was unconscionable where it applied
to all claims by employee against employer, but not most claims by employer against employee); Lambdin v.
District Court, 903 P.2d 1126 (Colo. 1995) (noting state wage act nonwaiver provision prevails over Uniform
Arbitration Act and to the extent that compensation plan's arbitration provision waived these substantive and
procedural rights, it was void); Baxter v. John Weitzel. Inc., 871 P.2d 855 (Kan. App. 1994) (concluding all
employment contracts exempt from state arbitration statute, governed by common law, and therefore revocable at
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arbitration process unilaterally to their best advantage. This has given rise to a
number of documented abuses, such as employers denying employees the right to
bring counsel to the arbitration, or the right to participate in selection of the
arbitrator.
12
A few courts have examined the precise terms of the employer's personnel
handbook more closely. In Heurtebise v. Reliable Business Computers, Inc.,
3
Theresa Heurtebise alleged that her former employer, Reliable Business Computers,
engaged in sex discrimination when they fired her, but not a male co-worker, for
taking lunch breaks in excess of one hour in duration. The couple went to lunch
together, but were treated differently, the plaintiff alleged. The defendant employer
moved to dismiss the case based on an arbitration clause in a personnel handbook,
the receipt of which plaintiff had acknowledged in writing upon her initial employ-
ment.' 4 The Michigan Supreme Court held that the clause demonstrated that the
employer did not intend to be bound to any provision contained in the handbook,
and thus, the handbook did not create an enforceable arbitration agreement. The
majority of the court declined to address the question of whether pre-dispute agree-
ments to arbitrate claims of discrimination violate public policy in Michigan.
Other courts have considered the waiver doctrine in the context of employment
arbitration. In Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corporation,5 the court held that
the employee did not knowingly waive his statutory rights to file suit under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) simply by signing a form acknowledging
receipt of a revised employee handbook in which he agreed to read and understand
the handbook. The handbook provided a complaint resolution policy which cul-
minated in arbitration for claims involving corrective action, discharge, or vio-
lations of the Equal Opportunity Nonharassment policy. Although the court
assumed arguendo that a knowing agreement to arbitrate would be enforceable
under the ADA, it reasoned that the acknowledgment form the employee signed was
any time prior to award).
12. See Mei L. Bickner et al., Developments in Employment Arbitration, J. DiSP. RESOL. 8 (Jan. 1997).
13. 550 N.W.2d 243 (Mich. 1996).
14. The handbook contained the following clause:
This document is intended to establish and clarify certain employment policies, practices, rules and
regulations... of Reliable Business Computers, Inc ..... Except as may otherwise be provided, the
Policies will apply to all company employees, and it is each employee's responsibility to assure that
his/her own conduct is in conformity with those policies. It is important to recognize and clarify that the
policies specified herein do not create any employment or personal contract, express or implied, nor is
it intended nor expected that the information provided in this document will provide sufficient detail to
answer any and all questions which may arise. NOTWITHSTANDING ANY OF THE SPECIFIC
POLICIES HEREIN, EACH EMPLOYEE HAS THE ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO TERMINATE
HIS/HER OWN EMPLOYMENT AT ANY TIME, WITHOUT NOTICE, AND FOR ANY REASON
WHATSOEVER, AND THE COMPANY HAS THE SAME RIGHT. From time to time, the company
specifically reserves the right, and may make modifications to any or all of the Policies herein, at its sole
discretion, and as future conditions may warrant. *
550 N.W.2d 243, 247 (Mich. 1996).
15. 119F.3d756(9thCir. 1997).
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inadequate because it did not notify the employee that the handbook contained an
arbitration clause or that he was waiving his statutory right to a judicial forum. In
addition, the court refused to infer agreement from the employee's continued em-
ployment. It required an express choice explicitly presented to the employee and to
which the employee explicitly agreed. Thus, the court held that the unilateral
promulgation of an employee handbook does not constitute a knowing agreement
on the part of an employee to waive a statutory remedy provided in a civil rights
law.
However, the trend is best exemplified by Cole v. Burns International Security
Services,16 in which the court enforced an arbitration agreement that explicitly
waived Cole's right to a jury trial, and required him at the employer's option to
submit any dispute relating to his recruitment, employment, or termination to
binding arbitration under American Arbitration Association rules. The agreement
covered statutory claims and common law claims but excluded Worker's Com-
pensation claims. The waiver of ajury trial was absolute and took effect even if the
employer chose to litigate instead of arbitrate. About two years later, Burns fired
Cole, who in turn filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission alleging race discrimination, racial harassment, retaliation for his writing
a letter of support for another employee who alleged sexual harassment, and,
finally, intentional infliction of emotional distress. Cole filed a complaint in federal
district court which was dismissed when the court granted Bums' subsequent
motion to compel arbitration. Cole appealed.
The court enforced the agreement, but expressly considered the enforceability
of conditions of employment requiring employees to arbitrate statutory claims in
light of the differences between commercial and labor arbitration. Commercial
arbitration substitutes for litigation, while labor arbitration substitutes for industrial
strife. Moreover, labor arbitration molds a system of private law to govern a private,
contractual relationship which is part of the continuous process of collective bar-
gaining. As a result, labor arbitration awards are subject to limited judicial review,
and generally not subject to reversal for an error of law.
The court observed that a lack of public disclosure of arbitration awards may
systematically favor companies over individuals. The court noted problems with
building a case for a pattern or practice of discrimination if all the complaints are
arbitrated because the awards are confidential and not published. It also observed
that employers may structure arbitration to their advantage unilaterally and may
shift the costs for arbitration to employees to create a financial disincentive to
litigate or arbitrate. The court responded largely by citing Gilmer as having resolved
the issue of whether agreements to arbitrate were enforceable notwithstanding these
concerns. However, the court held that the employer could not effectively deprive
the employee of a forum for resolving statutory employment claims by imposing
16. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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the substantial costs of arbitration on the employee. Employers must bear the full
freight of the arbitrator's fee. The court asserted there were protections against
arbitrators systematically favoring employers as the source of future business. I"
In parallel with these judicial developments, a number of policy-makers have
attempted to address the emerging due process issues in employment arbitration. 8
A number of major players in the dispute resolution field gathered to work out
desirable groundrules for employment arbitration. The result was A Due Process
Protocol For Mediation AndArbitration Of Statutory Disputes Arising Out Of The
Employment Relationship, a document signed in 1996 by representatives of the
National Academy of Arbitrators (NAA), the American Bar Association (ABA), the
American Arbitration Association (AAA), the National Employment Lawyers
Association (NELA), the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and others.19
Unlike the previous arbitration rules, the Protocol attempts to address how the dis-
pute resolution process is structured by the employer. The Protocol recommends
freedom of choice of representative, adequate but limited pre-hearing discovery,
providing the parties with references from the arbitrators most recent six cases,
arbitrator training in employment law, an enhanced duty for the arbitrator to dis-
close any relationship that might reasonably constitute or be perceived as a conflict
of interest, an arbitration award setting forth a summary of the issues, including the
type of dispute and damages or other relief requested and/or awarded, a statement
of the issues, and the statutory claims, and joint selection and shared compensation
of the arbitrator. The participants were unable to reach consensus on the enforce-
ability of predispute agreements to arbitrate, giving rise to what has been termed
"mandatory arbitration."
17. The court observed:
IThere are several protections against the possibility of arbitrators systematically favoring employers
because employers are the source of future business. For one thing, it is unlikely that such corruption
would escape the scrutiny of plaintiffs' lawyers or appointing agencies like the AAA. Corrupt arbitrators
will not survive long in the business. In addition, wise employers and their representatives should see
no benefit in currying the favor of corrupt arbitrators, because this will simply invite increased judicial
review of arbitral judgments. Finally, if the arbitrators who are assigned to hear and decide statutory
claims adhere to the professional and ethical standards set by arbitrators in the context of collective
bargaining, there is little reason for concern.
Cole v. Bums international Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
18. See, e.g., COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MGMT. REL., U.S. DEP'T OF LAB. AND U.S. DEP'T
oFCOM., REP. AND RECOMMENDATIONS, GPO-CTLG, L1.2-F 9812 (1994) (detailing the impetus for these efforts,
including the Dunlop Report, as well as listing minimal due process and procedural protections for employment
dispute resolution in the absence of a union). For a discussion of desirable due process safeguards, see also Stephen
Hayford and Ralph Peeples, Commercial Arbitration in Evolution: An Assessment and Callfor Dialogue, 10 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 343 (1995). For a comprehensive review of these developments, see JOHN T. DUNLOP &
ARNOLD M. ZACK, MEDIATION AND ARBrrRATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES (1997).
19. Reprinted in AM. ARB. ASsoC., GUIDEFOREMPLOYMENTARBrrRATORS, Pub. No. AAA219-IOM-8/96,
19-24 (1996). Most recently, the American Bar Association has approved the Protocol. See ABA Adopts Due
Process Protocol, DIsP. RESOL. TMES, Summer 1997, at 7.
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The agreed upon provisions were in turn incorporated into the AAA's National
Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes (June 1, 1996).20 This revision
requires arbitrators to disclose "all information that might be relevant to the stan-
dards of neutrality set forth in this Section, including, but not limited to, service as
a neutral in any past or pending cases involving any of the parties, or that may
prevent a prompt hearing."2 It also guarantees a right to counsel. The AAA National
Rules for the Resolution ofEmploymentDisputes have been modified more recently
effective June 1, 1997, but the disclosure rules are unchanged, and the amendments
are largely technical.22 The AAA has also issued a policy statement affirming its
commitment to voluntary use of dispute resolution.
On May 21,1997, the NAA adopted a policy opposing "mandatory employment
arbitration as a condition of employment when it requires waiver of direct access
to either a judicial or administrative forum for the pursuit of statutory rights." The
policy statement recognizes that Academy members may serve as arbitrators in such
cases under current law, but directs them to consider the fairness of the employment
arbitration procedure in light of NAA Guidelines. These guidelines permit an
arbitrator to withdraw from a case in the face of policies, rules or procedures that
are manifestly unfair or violate due process. Considerations include conflicts of
interest, adequate rights of representation, fair selection of the arbitrator, legal basis
for arbitrator jurisdiction, agency rules, fairness of time constraints, adequate
remedial power, convenient forum location, and a compensation arrangement con-
sistent with fairness and impartiality. The Guidelines provide that the arbitrator
should also examine issues, ensure production of evidence, discuss witness lists,
ensure discovery necessary for a fair proceeding, determine whether the rules of
evidence should apply, follow the Due Process Protocol, and serve only so long as
fundamental due process protections are afforded. They direct that the arbitrator
must safeguard the substantive statutory rights of the parties and should familiarize
him or herself with shifting burdens of proof that apply to a statutory claim. The
arbitrator should provide a written reasoned award and opinion with findings of fact
and reasoning for conclusions of law on each claim, must identify and deal with all
statutory issues raised, and may cite authority from administrative agencies and
courts. The arbitrator should also issue remedies consistent with the statute and
what a court could have provided. The NAA will continue to use these guidelines
for three years unless they are extended or modified. 23
20. AM. ARB. ASSOC., NAT'L RULES FORTHE RESOLUTION OFEMPLOYMENT DISPUTES, Pub. No. AAA 121-
20M-6/96 (1996) [hereinafter NAT'L RULES FOR THE RESOL. OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES].
21. NAT'LRULESFORTHERESOL. OFEMt4PLOYMENT DISPUTES, Rule 11(b).
22. AM. ARB. ASsoc., Modifications Made in the AAA 's Employment Rules, DISPUTE RESOL. TIMES,
Summer 1997, at 3.
23. For an excellent practical roadmap for how an arbitrator should administer one of these cases and
comport with these guidelines, see Cary Singletary, unpublished manuscript presented at Society for Professionals
in Dispute Resolution, September 26, 1997, Orlando, Florida (manuscript on file with the author).
230
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On July 11, 1997, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
issued a policy guideline taking a position against mandatory arbitration of claims
arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.24 Since civil rights laws play a
unique role in United States jurisprudence and involve core constitutional prin-
ciples, and because Congress has delegated responsibility for administering and
enforcing them to the EEOC and the federal courts, the EEOC took the position that
it is inappropriate to delegate this statutory authority to an arbitrator absent
voluntary, informed, post-dispute consent. It argued that civil rights laws represent
important public policy that the federal courts have enforced through precedent,
which both develops civil rights jurisprudence and is available to the public through
publication. The EEOC also cited the need for consistent precedent through
oversight by the United States Supreme Court as a basis for this policy guideline.2
It reasoned that employers, employees, and unions need the guidance provided by
publicly available precedent, and the public needs to know the costs of dis-
crimination.
The EEOC contended that arbitration, in contrast, does not allow for develop-
ment in the law, particularly when it is private. The EEOC also maintained that
mandatory arbitration has a built-in bias for the employer who is a repeat player and
thus has better information it can use in choosing an arbitrator. An employer is also
likely to be seen as a source of future business by the arbitrator, but the employee
is not, and mandatory arbitration is imposed by an employer as an aspect of "its
superior bargaining power." The EEOC believes that in many cases these waivers
are legally insufficient because one cannot waive rights unless the waiver is
knowing and voluntary. The average employee will not know what he or she is
waiving by giving up the right to trial. In sum, at the time of this writing,
predispute, adhesive arbitration agreements are generally enforceable, but a policy
debate is occurring on the subject of how to safeguard employees' statutory rights
under public law.
24. EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (July 10, 1997), reprinted in part in Ellen J. Vargyas, EEOC Rejects
Mandatory Binding Employment Arbitration, 52 J. Disp. RESOL. 8 (Fall 1997). For discussions pro and con, see
Joseph D. Garrison, Pro: Mandatory Binding Arbitration Constitutes Little More Than a Waiver of a Worker's
Rights, 52 J. DisP. RESOL 15 (Fall 1997), and Martin J. Oppenheimer & Cameron Johnstone, Con: Mandatory
Arbitration Agreements are an Effective Alternative to Employment Litigation, 52 J. DISP. RESOL. 19 (Fall 1997).
25. For extensive and thorough discussions of the tension between confidentiality in arbitration and the
public interest in judicial precedent enforcing public policy as reflected in statutory rights, see Martin H. Malin &
RobertF. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential Perspective on LaborandEmploymentArbitrationfrom
the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187 (1993); Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a
State Action Theory of ADR, 85 CAL L. REV. 579 (1997); Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of
the Supreme Court's Preferencefor Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers,
and Due Process Concerns, 72 TIUL L. REV. 1 (1997).
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II. EMPiRCAL RESEARCH ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION
OUTCOMES
Empirical research has a role to play in this policy debate. It can help identify
where structural change or judicial review is necessary. There is a long and well
established tradition of empirical research on the processes and outcomes of dispute
resolution in the field of industrial relations. In labor arbitration, where both em-
ployer and union are repeat players, traditional measures reveal a rough parity in
outcomes. There is substantial research on outcomes in labor arbitration, including
grievance or rights arbitration,26 and interest arbitration.27 One common method is
to examine arbitration outcomes in relation to a variable; for example, some
researchers have found gender effects in grievance arbitration.28 In a recent study
of 3,949 public and private sector published labor arbitration cases, grievants won
their cases in whole or in part 52% of the time, and in a subsample of 1,427
discipline cases, grievants won their cases in whole or in part approximately 57%
of the time.29 Only about 10% of all labor arbitration awards are published, and the
published sample is not random but instead the product of careful editorial
selection. However, others have observed that labor arbitration cases generally split
50:50, with unions winning grievances in whole or in part about half the time, and
these results are based on records including unpublished awards.3
There is limited empirical research on employment arbitration. One study com-
pared settled, litigated, and arbitrated employment discrimination case outcomes
and surveyed counsel regarding case practices.3' It found that mean and median jury
verdicts in employment discrimination cases were at least three times higher than
the comparable mean and median arbitration awards. Another study found that most
employment arbitration procedures were developed recently (1994-1996), and that
26. R.N. Block, & J. Stieber, The Impact Of Attorneys And Arbitrators On Arbitration Awards, 40 INDUS.
& LAB. REL. REV., 544, 543-555 (1987); RJ. Thornton & P.A. Zirkel, The Consistency And Predictability Of
Grievance Arbitration Awards, 43 INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 294, 294-307 (1990).
27. Peter Feuille & Sysan Schwochau, The Decisions OfInterest Arbitrators, 43 ARB. J. 28, 28-35 (1988);
Sysan Schwochau & Peter Feuille, InterestArbitrators And Their Decision Behavior, 27 INDUs. & LAB. REL. REV.,
37,37-55 (1988).
28. B. Bemmels, The Effect of Grievants' Gender on Arbitrators' Decisions, 41 INDUs. & LAB. REL. REV.,
251, 251-62 (1988a), B. Bemmels, Gender Effects in Discipline Arbitration: Evidence fron British Columbia, 31
ACAD. OFMGMT. J., 699, 699-706 (1988b) ; B. Bemmels, Gender Effects in Discharge Arbitration, 42 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 63,63-76 (1988c) ; B. Bemmels, The Effects OfGrievants' Gender And Arbitrator Characteristics
On Arbitration Decisions., 15 LAB. STUD. J. 48, 48-61 (1990a).
29. D.J. Mesch, Grievance Arbitration in the Public Sector: A Conceptual Framework and Empirical
Analysis of Public and Private SectorArbitration Cases, XV(4) REV. OF PUB. PERSONNEL ADMIN. 22,22-36, tbls.
1 & 3 (1995).
30. Peter Feuille, Dispute Resolution Frontiers in the Unionized Workplace, in WORKPLACE DIsPUTE
RESOLUTION: DmECToRs FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Sandra E. Gleason ed., Michigan State Univ. Press
1997) (citing statistics from AM. ARB. Assoc., STUDY TME (1993)).
31. William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination: What Really Does Happen?
What Really Should Happen?, 50 J. DisP. RESOL 40 (1995).
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over 75% of the employers surveyed adopted the plans to reduce litigation costs,
while only 15% of employers did so to improve employee relations or give em-
ployees a voice.32 Most plans were developed by human resources staff and legal
counsel without employee input. About 75% of the plans made arbitration a con-
dition of employment. Ten percent of the plans prohibited employees from using
outside counsel. Almost 15% of the plans provided for unilateral employer selection
of the arbitrator. All of this provides empirical evidence for Galanter's proposition
that repeat players have strategic superiority in that they can structure a transaction
to their advantage.
On the other hand, a one-year sample of 1992 AAA Commercial Arbitration
awards revealed no evidence of a systematic pro-employer bias in employment
arbitration outcomes. 33 That study examined arbitration outcomes in relation to the
variables of who filed the claim (employer or employee) and whether the arbitrator
received compensation (under prior rules arbitrators served pro bono if the case
took only one day to hear). Under the Commercial rules, either the employer or the
employee could file a claim or demand arbitration. Typically, employees filed
claims arising out of dismissal, while employers sought to recover unearned com-
missions, cancel stock options, or enforce covenants not to compete. Employees had
superior outcomes on their own claims to employers on theirs both in terms of win
rate (2.8:1, or winning something about 74% of the time) and percentage of demand
recovered as damages, whether or not the arbitrator was compensated. Employees
recovered 39% of their demand when the arbitrator was compensated, but em-
ployers only recovered 10% of theirs. In pro bono cases, employees recovered on
average 62% of their demand, while employers recovered only 44%. This study
tended to indicate arbitrators were not responding to a financial incentive of repeat
business by generally favoring employers. The lower average outcome when the
arbitrator earned a fee seemed to reflect the fact that these were more hotly con-
tested, multi-day cases. However, employees in this sample of Commercial cases
tended to be highly compensated managerial or executive employees, represented
by counsel.
Effective January 1, 1993, the AAA implemented its Employment Dispute
Resolution Rules (Employment Rules); this was a new set of rules for the arbitration
of nonunion employment disputes?4 Nonunion employment disputes had been
covered for many years primarily as a special area under the AAA's Commercial
Rules, 3 but the new rules were designed to meet the growing need for dispute
32. For a recent review of the evolution of the debate and survey of employer-promulgated plans, see Mei
L. Bickner et al., Developments in Employment Arbitration: Analysis of a New Survey of Employment Arbitration
Programs, 52 J. DIsP. RESOL 8-15, 78-84 (1997).
33. Lisa B. Bingham, Is There A Bias In Arbitration Of Non-Union Employment Disputes? An Analysis Of
Actual Cases And Outcomes, 6 INT'L. OF CONFLICT MGrT. 369,369-86 (1995).
34. NAT'LRULES FORTHEREOLUTIONOFEMPLOYMENTDISPUTES, Pub. No. AAA121-IOM-12/92 (1993).
35. See AM. ARB. ASS'NCOM. ARB.RULES,Revised Rules and Fees for Cases Filed on or after May 1, 1992.
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resolution for employment cases generally. Since many parties incorporated the
Commercial Rules into their contracts, the AAA continued to administer arbitration
cases under both sets of rules. The Employment Rules contained differences in
sections regarding appointment of the arbitrator and disclosure of information about
the arbitrator, but, for the most part, the new Employment Rules were substantively
the same as the previous Commercial Rules. An empirical study provided evidence
that different populations of employees might be using the new AAA Employment
Rules, and, in particular, this study provided the first evidence that there were repeat
player employers using arbitration pursuant to the terms of unilaterally imposed
personnel handbooks or policies.36 These cases were more likely than commercial
cases to involve unrepresented employees who lost a claim involving their dismissal
from employment. The sample of employment cases available was too small (n=28)
to do more than identify emerging concerns about due process.
A subsequent study examined a 270-case sample consisting of arbitration
awards decided in 1993 under the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules (n= 186) and
arbitration awards decided in 1993 and 1994 under the AAA Employment Dispute
Resolution Rules (n=84).37 These were cases decided before the existence of the
Due Process Protocol for the Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Employment
Disputes and before the AAA adopted the National Rules for the Resolution of
EmploymentDisputes (effective June 1, 1996). Thus, the arbitration award decision
patterns reflected the earliest period of employment arbitration, before new pro-
cedural protections were put into place. These patterns are not necessarily repre-
sentative of current decision patterns under newer AAA rules, and research into the
newer rules is ongoing. The study compared employee outcomes when the em-
ployer is a repeat player (i.e., in the case sample more than once) with employee
outcomes when the employer is a one-time player in the sample.
The study found that arbitrators award employees damages in any amount in
statistically significantly lower frequencies when the employer is a repeat player.
Employees arbitrating with one-time player employers win something at the rate of
2.4:1, or over 70% of the time. Employees arbitrating with repeat player employers
win something at the rate of 1:5.2, or about 16% of the time. Employees also have
significantly lower outcomes in cases involving repeat player employers. In repeat
player cases, employees recover only 11% of what they demand, on average, while
in cases involving non-repeat player employers, employees recover an average of
48%; this difference is statistically significant.
The study also examined the impact of employee resources on outcomes by
categorizing employees, where possible, by their job category as white collar
middle management or executives, blue collar workers, or pink collar workers
36. Lisa B. Bingham, Emerging Due Process Concerns in Employment Arbitration: A Look at Actual Cases,
47 LABOR L. J. 108, 108-26 (1996).
37. Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, I EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPLOY-
mEmPOL'YJ. 189 (1997).
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(clerical, non-physician medical, technical, sales, and other low salary white collar
workers). White collar employees have significantly higher win rates and better
outcomes than blue or pink collar workers. White collar managers won something
at the rate of 3.4:1, or 77% of the time. This finding was consistent with the study
of 1992 Commercial Rules cases, which also involved predominantly white collar
managers. The mean white collar employee outcome was a recovery of 54% of the
demand, while the blue collar mean was 8%, and the pink collar mean was 25%.
Blue collar workers won at a rate of 1:5.2, or about 16% of the time, while pink
collar workers won at the rate of .75:1, or about 43% of the time.
I. EMPmICAL FINDINGS ON THE REPEAT PLAYER EMPLOYER AND PERSONNEL
MANUALS
Under the 1993 Commercial Rules, arbitrators were encouraged to write one-
page awards with no reasoning or analysis; many arbitrators deciding cases under
the 1993-1994 Employment Dispute Resolution Rules followed that tradition.38
However, arbitration demand forms indicated that many of the repeat player cases
involved arbitration pursuant to the terms of a personnel manual or employee hand-
book, while most of the non-repeat player cases stemmed from express written con-
tracts. Employees under a personnel manual may have substantively weaker claims,
since they are more likely to be employees at will, and the contract is one of ad-
hesion. Employees with an express written contract may have a substantively
stronger claim because they may be able to negotiate a fixed term of employment
or other protections. Most of the express contract cases involved highly compen-
sated white collar employees who arguably had more bargaining power. The earlier
study found that white collar executives did better in employment arbitration than
blue or pink collar workers. This suggested there might be systematic differences
in the merits of the cases, possibly a product of the relative bargaining power bet-
ween employer and employee, that might explain the repeat player effect.
Earlier studies suggested the following working hypotheses:
H(1): Employers will have superior outcomes when they are repeat
players.
H(2): Employers will have superior outcomes where arbitration is
pursuant to a personnel manual than when arbitration is pursuant
to an individual contract.
H(3): Employers will have superior outcomes when making repeat use
of an arbitrator.
38. Id. The current Employment Dispute Resolution Rules require a reasoned award. Id.
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A. Method
The instant study39 examines a sample of 203 cases, consisting exclusively of
cases decided under the Employment Dispute Resolution Rules of the American
Arbitration Association during the period from January 1, 1993, through December
31, 1995. Only cases that resulted in an award during this time period were
examined. This study represents a macrojustice assessment of employment arbi-
tration; in other words, the study examines the overall pattern of outcomes produced
by the dispute resolution process in a sample of actual cases, without controlling for
the merits of the individual case beyond identifying the source of the agreement to
arbitrate. 4° Cases were excluded on one of the following grounds: (1) essential
information was missing, (2) the award represented a settlement or stipulated award,
or (3) the case was not an employment dispute, but instead a partnership or real
estate dispute. For each case, the researcher examined, where available, the demand
for arbitration, arbitrator's award, and AAA closing data sheet. Most of these
awards contained more information than the traditional commercial style award
because the Employment Dispute Resolution Rules require the arbitrator to write
a reasoned decision. Both employers and employees may file claims under these
rules. Employer claims tend to concern unearned advances on compensation, stock
options, and enforcement of covenants not to compete. Employee claims tend to
arise out of dismissal from employment. Table 1 shows the characteristics of the
sample of awards, including employer (ER) and employee (EE) claims.
39. This study was presented at the Industrial Relations Research Association 50th Annual Meeting, January
3, 1998, Chicago, Illinois, and an earlier form of this paper will appear in the 50th Proceedings of the Industrial
Relations Research Association (forthcoming, 1998).
40. W.D. Todor & C.L. Owen, Deriving Benefits from Conflict Resolution: A Macrojustice Assessment, 4
EMPLOYaERTs. &EMPLoYMENTPoL'YJ.. 37,37-49(1991).
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of Sample
Demand
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Median
ER Claims $41,083 71,239 15,000
EE Claims $165,128 507,726 21,254
All Claims $153,541 485,111 18,450
Damages Amount
Mean SD Median
ER Claims 12,027 37,329 0
EE Claims 49,030 188,299 0
All Claims 45,869 180,645 0
Outcome
Mean SD Median
ER Claims .23 .37 0
EE Claims .25 .41 0
All Claims .25 .41 0
The outcome ratio can be converted to a percentage of claim recovered by multi-
plying the ratio by 100.
Independent variables include whether the case is an employer or an employee
claim, whether the case involves a personnel manual or an individual written con-
tract, whether the case involves a repeat player employer (defined as an employer
who uses arbitration more than once in the sample), whether the case involves a
repeat player employermaking repeat use of a single arbitrator (using the same arbi-
trator for more than one case in the sample), and the amount of the claim or
demand. Dependent variables include the dollar amount of damages (Damages
Amount) and the percentage of claim recovered (a ratio of Damages Amount
divided by Demand named Outcome). In addition, a dichotomous variable entitled
Relief was created to indicate a win by the claiming party of any amount or a
recovery or other equitable relief, such as reinstatement of the employee.
Mean
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B. Results
Since the primary focus of the hypotheses is the comparison of employee out-
comes with repeat player and one-shotter employees, claims filed by employers
were excluded from the following analyses.
Among employee claims against employers, repeat player employers do better
in employment arbitration than non-repeat player employers.
Table 2




No Relief 38 (22%) 46 (26%) 84 (48%)
Relief 77 (44%) 14 (8%) 91(52%)
TOTAL 115 (66%) 60(34%) 175 (100%)
This distribution shows that employees lose with significantly greater frequency
when they arbitrate with arepeat player employer, Pearson Chi-Square 30.0609 (DF
1) P< 0.00001.
Employees lose more frequently when the arbitrator is one the employer has
used at least once before.
Table 3
Relief by Repeat Arbitrator-Employee Claims Only
Non-Repeat Repeat
Arbitrator Arbitrator TOTAL
No Relief 69 (39%) 15 (9%) 84 (48%)
Relief 86(49%) 5 (3%) 91(52%)
TOTAL 155 (88%) 20 (12%) 175 (100%)
This distribution shows statistically significant differences in the employee win rate,
Pearson Chi-Square 6.5951 (DF 1) P< 0.01.
However, these patterns largely correspond with differences in the nature of the
basis for arbitration. Repeat player employers generally get to arbitration based on
an arbitration clause in a personnel manual or employee handbook. Generally, Table
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4 shows that employees more frequently lose cases stemming from such a manual
or handbook.
Table 4
Relief by Personnel Manual-Employee Claims Only
Individual Personnel
Contract Manual TOTAL
No Relief 34(20%) 48(28%) 82(48%)
Relief 75 (44%) 13 (8%) 88 (52%)
TOTAL 109 (64%) 61(36%) 170 (100%)
Again, this distribution shows statistically significant differences in the, employee
win rate, Pearson Chi-Square 35.3362 (DF 1), P< 0.00001. This tends to show that
adhesive arbitration agreements put the employee at a disadvantage.
Another dependent variable is Outcome, the ratio created when the damages
awarded by the arbitrator are divided by the amount the employee demanded. To
test the effect on outcome of an employer's repeat player status and the personnel
manual or handbook as the source of an agreement to arbitrate, a two-way analysis
of variance was conducted using Outcome as the dependent variable and Repeat
Player and Personnel Manual as factors. The anova was significant as to the inter-
action between the two independent variables, F=5.005 (DF 1, 151), P<.03. The
presence of both factors together signals a poor outcome in arbitration for the em-
ployee. This interaction suggests that the repeat player effect may itself be a product
of other factors, including the underlying agreement to arbitrate as reflected in a
personnel manual, rather than an individually negotiated contract.
IV. AccouNTs FOR THE REPEAT PLAYER EFFECT
The repeat player effect is a cause for concern because in dispute resolution,
sometimes the perception of fairness is as important as the reality. There is un-
deniably a repeat player effect in employment arbitration; this study replicates
findingg in the earlier study of 270 Commercial and Employment Dispute Reso-
lution rules cases.41 However, the problem is to account for the effect. There are
several possible theoretical accounts for why a repeat player effect might arise in
the absence of unions. It is helpful to relate Galanter's catalogue of repeat player
advantages to these possible accounts and outline possible directions for future
research.
41. Bingham, supra note 37.
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A. Experience Leading To Changes In How The Repeat Player Structures The
Next Similar Transaction
Employers may maintain institutional memory and are better able to use records
regarding an arbitrator to make educated selections for the next arbitration case. For
example, the employer may know that arbitrator A places the burden of proof on the
employee to show the employer acted in an arbitrary and capricious fashion in
discipline, while arbitrator B places the burden of proving just cause for discipline
on the employer. An employer with this information would select arbitrator A. An
employee without any information about the arbitrators' records could not dis-
tinguish between arbitrator A and arbitrator B. While employers with few cases
would be less likely to have this information, repeated experience over time might
provide it. Employers may also use their experience to restructure the adhesive
contracts found in personnel manuals and employee handbooks. The employer has
wide latitude to structure the personnel manual so as to favor the employer to the
greatest extent possible in an employment at will relationship. For example, the
employer may specify explicitly that the employee may be dismissed with or
without cause at will. Moreover, the employer can try to structure the arbitration
hearing process to its advantage, subject to regulation by the courts and the rules of
the arbitration service provider.42 Cole v. Burns International Security Services, Inc.
suggests that the courts will intervene when an employer crafts a system too skewed
in favor of the employer, for example, by requiring the employee to pay for the
arbitrator.43 However, the law is unsettled on precisely what will represent an
unfairly skewed system.44 In addition, while large institutional arbitration service
providers such as the AAA may be sensitive to adopting procedures that protect
against this, most notably with the Due Process Protocol, other small providers may
not.
42. See, e.g., PrimericaFin. Servs., Inc. v. Wise,456 S.E.2d 631, 634 (Ga. App. 1995). Enforcing arbitration
clause and rejecting employee's argument that if court severs those portions of arbitration agreement it believes are
unenforceable, and enforces remainder, then employers will
be able to fashion truly ominous arbitration agreements with confidence that they will not be struck
down in their entirety, but simply pared down and enforced by the courts.... [w]ith the net effect...
that employers will intentionally draft unduly burdensome and complex arbitration agreement to deter
employees who do not understand the legal system from pursuing claims against their employers.
l
43. 105 F.3d 1465, 1481-82 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
44. In Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996), the court held that an arbitration agreement requiring
payment of the physician's attorney's fees in a medical malpractice action if the patient recovered less than half the
amount claimed was substantively unconscionable, but an arbitration panel consisting of neutral surgeons was not,
and the court remanded the case to determine whether to sever the unconscionable'clause and enforce the rest of
the arbitration agreement. For a discussion of how the unconscionability doctrine might apply in arbitration, see
Stephen 3. Ware, Arbitration and UnconscionabilityAfter Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAICEFOREST
L. REV. 1001 (1996).
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B. Expertise, Economies Of Scale, And Access To Specialist Advocates
The repeat player employer may do better in arbitration because it learns about
the process and has an opportunity to improve personnel practices and screen out
weak or losing cases through settlement. This is the accepted account for experience
in arbitrating "lemon law" claims, that is claims against manufacturers for defective
cars. Over time, the manufacturers prevailed more frequently. Employers dealing
with labor unions also have ample opportunity to learn about the arbitration process
and get better at screening cases. Nevertheless, in labor arbitration the historic
employer/union win rates have been fairly constant. Even in dismissal cases, where
employers are most motivated to learn in order to avoid back pay liability, there is
a steady loss rate of around 30%. One explanation for this steady rate is that unions
also get better at screening cases over time, and essentially the two learning curves
cancel each other out. This could explain steady rates in contract interpretation
cases. However, the duty of fair representation limits the degree to which unions
can screen dismissal cases. Many unions will arbitrate even a weak dismissal case
in order to protect themselves from a duty of fair representation claims. Thus, while
there is clearly a learning curve at the early stages of a new and possibly
acrimonious collective bargaining relationship, how does one explain this constant
loss rate for well-established bargaining partners, particularly with regard to dis-
missal cases? This dataset sheds no light on the question, nor can the question be
answered using the methodology of this study. Only a survey or interview study of
employers might reveal whether they are improving personnel practices as a result
of experience with employment arbitration.
Yet another possibility is that the pattern is a reflection of the unequal bar-
gaining power between employer and individual unrepresented employee, reflected
in economies of scale in preparing cases or access to expert advocates. This unequal
bargaining power might have a variety of manifestations, for example, in the
absenc of legal or other representation for the employee in the arbitration hearing.
One analysis suggests that the plaintiffs' bar will be less likely to take an employ-
ment arbitration case than a comparable piece of employment litigation because the
expected damage award may be lower in arbitration than from a jury.45 Represen-
tatives of the plaintiffs' bar suggest that they will make up in quantity of arbitration
caseload what they will lose in the magnitude of any one piece of litigation; their
opposition to mandatory arbitration stems instead from the involuntary, less-than-
knowing waiver of statutory rights found in many pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate imposed through adhesive contracts.46 Whatever the cause, many em-
45. For a more detailed analysis of this point, see Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat
Player Effect, 1 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPLOYMENT PoL'Y J. 189 (1997).
46. Joseph D. Garrison, Pro: Mandatory Binding Arbitration Constitutes Little More Than a Waiver of a
Worker's Rights, 52 J. DisP. RESOL. 15 (Fall 1997).
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ployees are going into employment arbitration hearings without the benefit of
counsel.4'
C. Informal Continuing Relationships With Institutional Incumbents
One possibility is that arbitrators, freed from the free market constraint of
having to worry about future selection by both parties, might tend to rule in favor
of the only party in a position to maintain an institutional memory and use
arbitrators again in the future, namely the employer. Arbitrators value their
reputation for integrity, and professional standards and ethics would suggest the
vast majority of arbitrators would not consciously consider this as a factor in their
decision-making. However, many have recognized that the ability of both the union
and management to participate in future selection of the arbitrator brings a certain
balance and self-regulation to the field of labor arbitration. 8
One result of this study is the finding that employees lose more frequently when
a repeat player employer is making repeat use of an arbitrator. This finding is
statistically significant, but should be viewed with some caution because, in every
case where an employer was making repeat use of an arbitrator, the case arose under
a personnel manual. An employee arbitrating pursuant to a personnel manual may
have a substantively weaker legal claim which contributes to the relatively weak
employee outcomes.
An analysis using only cases where arbitration occurs under a personnel manual
produced no significant differences between cases where the repeat player employer
is making repeat use of an arbitrator and cases where it is using an arbitrator for the
first timein the case sample. The case frequency was too low in that sample to
produce reliable significance tests, but the rates with which the two groups of arbit-
rators awarded relief appeared comparable. Moreover, personnel manuals might be
more likely to produce repeat use of arbitration, since they apply to all the
employer's employees, while an individual written contract applies only to the
employee who signed it. One question for future research is whether, among repeat
players using the same basis for arbitration (a personnel manual), making repeat use
of an arbitrator produces better or comparable employer outcomes.
Not all individual written contracts necessarily put the employee in a superior
position. This study shows that, overall, such a contract is associated with superior
employee outcomes. The problem that this study does not reach is the actual
decision standard used by the arbitrator. For example, it is possible for both an
individual written contract and a personnel manual alike to provide that the
"employee understands he/she is employed at will and subject to termination at any
47. Lisa B. Bingham, Emerging Due Process Concerns in EmploymentArbitration: A Look atActual Cases
47 LAB. LJ. 108 (1996).
48. See, e.g., Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 105 F.3d 1465, 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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time with or without cause." Particularly if the arbitrator is an employment lawyer,
he or she might be reluctant to intervene in the at will employment relationship
unless the employee can prove a case under one of the exceptions to the employ-
ment at will doctrine, i.e., statutory discrimination, wrongful discharge. Such a
decision standard is likely to be present in most personnel manuals if the employer
has had the benefit of counsel. Whether it is present in individual written contracts
in employment arbitration remains to be determined. This is another area for future
research.
D. Bargaining Reputation and Credibility
Apart from any economic incentive, arbitrators do develop a sense of whether
a particular advocate has integrity and credibility. In the labor arbitration field,
advocates are sensitive to the fact that they will likely appear before the same small
group of labor arbitrators on a repeated basis throughout their professional careers;
these advocates value their bargaining reputation. There is a certain comradery
among the labor law bar and neutrals, historically found in such organizations as the
Industrial Relations Research Association, which makes it seem nonsensical to
require arbitrators to disclose prior cases either with counsel or their clients. How-
ever, an individual unrepresented employee, whose employment is on the line, has
difficulty in developing a similar reputation with the arbitrator. Moreover, most
plaintiffs' counsel are likely to have fewer repeat contacts with any one arbitrator.49
E. Long-Term Strategies Facilitating Risk-Taking in Appropriate Cases and
Distinguishing Between Symbolic and Actual Defeats
Employers may be less willing to settle employment arbitration cases, due to
the lower transaction costs associated with the process, and the desire to deter
claims. This long-term strategy may justify arbitrating a borderline claim and
risking a loss in arbitration.
F. Influencing Rules Through Lobbying and Other Use of Resources and
Investing Resources in Getting Rules Favorable to Them Implemented
There has been a dramatic increase in the acceptability of alternative dispute
resolution among large corporate employers. The past two decades have seen the
formation of the Center for Public Resources, now CPR Institute, to foster use of
ADR among and between Fortune 500 companies. The AAA, in collaboration with
Forbes Magazine, sponsored an ADR Superconference, at which many of these
49. For a more detailed discussion, see Lisa B. Bingham, Employnent Arbitration: The Repeat Player
Effect, 1 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPLOYMENT POL'Y J. 189 (1997).
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large corporate employers were represented. There has been a sea change in the
attitudes of courts with crowded dockets toward ADR. Individual employees are
less able to devote resources to influencing the public discourse on ADR, and what
form arbitration should take, although the plaintiffs' bar has participated on their
behalf.
G. Playing for Precedent and Favorable Future Rules
In addition to using experience to restructure the employment contract uni-
laterally through a personnel manual, the employer may have an incentive to litigate
the enforceability of the manual's provisions. Each case can help establish the
boundaries of enforceable adhesive arbitration clauses. The individual employee
may not be motivated to set precedent for others in the area of employment law.
H. Which of Galanter's Accounts is Best?
Unfortunately, these various accounts for the repeat player effect are not
mutually exclusive, and tracking down the possible role of each account is a com-
plex empirical problem. The finding that there is a repeat player effect nevertheless
supports proactive and preventive efforts of dispute resolution users and providers
to limit the extent to which the employer has effective unilateral control over the
selection of the arbitrator. All of this research addresses the earliest phase of em-
ployment arbitration, before the Due Process Protocol, and serves to underscore the
wisdom of attempting to guarantee certain minimum due process protections for
employees. Newly adopted disclosure rules may provide employees with better
information upon which to base their choice of an arbitrator and may reduce the
repeat player effect. All of the cases studied in this sample were decided before the
AAA adopted new rules requiring arbitrators to disclose when a party is making
repeat use of them. The major institutional providers, specifically the AAA and
JAMS-Endispute, have issued policy statements that they will only administer cases
that comport with the Protocol. However, it is unclear to what extent the many
smaller providers and individual practitioners have undertaken to implement the
Protocol. Another area for future research is to examine whether compliance with
the Protocol will alter the overall pattern of outcomes in employment arbitration.
V. THE REPEAT PLAYER EFFECT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EMPLOYMENT
ARBITRATION
As the recent opinion in Cole v. Burns International"0 suggests, if employers,
ADR providers, and arbitrators fail to implement the Protocol, or if arbitrators
50. Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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systematically rule for employers, the process of employment arbitration may invite
increased judicial scrutiny and decreased finality of the resulting arbitration
awards. 5' What should trigger that scrutiny, and what form should it take?52 How
should we begin to think about the problem of judicial review for partiality or bias
in light of the repeat player effect? Some scholars characterize issues of bias as
active contrasted with passive partiality.53 Active partiality represents actual bias
of an individual arbitrator in a particular case, for example, through comments made
during the hearing favoring one party over the other, or showing a predisposition
to rule one way before the evideice is entirely in.' Passive partiality represents a
prior personal, professional, or business relationship between an arbitrator and one
of the parties which raises concerns about whether the arbitrator is impartial; it is
intimately connected with the disclosure rules in arbitration.55 Both of these
categories concern the relationship between an individual arbitrator and the parties
to a particular case. A third category might be called structural bias. This category
concerns the operation of the arbitration agreement and the rules under which the
arbitration is conducted, and whether these are structured so as to skew the process
unacceptably in favor of one party. What bearing does statistical analysis of case
outcomes have on these categories of bias?
A. Active Partiality or Actual Individual Arbitrator Bias
One initial question is what constitutes an arbitrator "systematically" ruling for
one side. When can we conclude that an individual arbitrator is actually, actively
biased? Courts rarely find that a given arbitrator is actively biased; these cases are
notoriously difficult to prove.56 Arbitrators develop styles and views on particular
issues, for example, how to examine a dismissal or a drug-testing case; this does not
represent bias. Advocates develop common sense approaches to arbitrator selection;
they may look at an arbitrator's track record, or decide based on their experience in
past cases with that arbitrator, or examine available published awards or analyses
of the arbitrator's record.57 Simply because an arbitrator has a particular record, is
51. See id. (enforcing employment arbitration agreement and holding that an employer has an obligation
to pay arbitrator's fees as a condition of the enforceability of an agreement).
52. The discussion that follows is limited to certain questions of arbitrator partiality. For a more detailed
review and comprehensive analysis of cases on impartiality, see Alan S. Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S.
T0. L. REV. 485 (1997). See generally, IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL, FEDERAL ARBrrRATION LAW § 28 (1997). For an
analysis of vacatur of arbitration awards under the Federal Arbitration Act, see Stephen L. Hayford, Law in
Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731 (1996).
53. MACNEUL, supra note 52, § 28.1.3 (1997).
54. Id. § 28.1.3.2.
55. Id. § 28.2.1.
56. Id. § 28.1.3.2.
57. For a nuts and bolts discussion of selecting arbitrators in securities arbitration, see David E.
Shellenberger, Selection and Challenge of Arbitrators, 1 SEC. ARB. 581, 595 (July, 1995) (discussing the
inappropriateness of service based on status as a professional arbitrator-meaning an arbitrator who frequently
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it reasonable for a court to conclude the arbitrator is actively biased? The answer
is probably not, for a variety of reasons.
There are no available published analyses of employment arbitration awards,
since the awards themselves are confidential, and there is as yet no system for
tracking them. Moreover, even where arbitration awards are published, for example,
in the context of labor arbitration, the published awards represent fewer than 10%
of the population of all such cases, in other words, only a sample of the population.
The sample of cases published is not random. It is the product of careful editorial
selection for reader interest and precedential value or significance. If a sample is not
random, then there are logical problems with drawing conclusions about the nature
of the population from characteristics of the sample. We may have only the cutting
edge cases in the published body of precedent, not the average garden variety arbi-
tration. Thus, the published labor arbitration cases are not necessarily representative
of all arbitration outcomes.
With respect to employment arbitration, there are a few larger providers of dis-
pute resolution services, such as the AAA or JAMS-Endispute, which would have
a significant case pool. However, there are many smaller providers and solo
practitioners who are providing arbitration services independently. This raises the
question whether the distribution of arbitrator track records found in an AAA or
JAMS-Endispute case sample is representative of this other, much less visible,
population of employment arbitration cases. The larger providers have adopted the
Protocol; however, recent attendees at a state bar dispute resolution section meeting
had never heard of the Protocol. It is likely that there would be differences in the
decision patterns of arbitrators operating under the Protocol and those who are not.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the entire population of employment
arbitration awards were publicly available, it would be necessary to look at the
distribution of arbitrator track records, not simply the distribution of outcomes in
cases decided by a single arbitrator. Given the unequal bargaining power between
employer and employee, and the common law rule that all employment is ter-
minable at will, it is possible that employment arbitration awards would not split
fifty-fifty on the merits. Employers are likely to have stronger cases as a matter of
law than they do in the context of collective bargaining, where just cause for dis-
missal limits employer discretion in matters of discipline. Thus, it is reasonable to
expect employers to win more of these cases in employment arbitration. Assuming
each arbitrator had a large enough body of decided cases, it is theoretically possible
to calculate a mean percentage of cases decided in favor of each party, here defined
as employers or employees generally, and to develop a distribution of these arbitral
track records. If one assumes that each arbitrator gets a random sample of cases,
serves and consistently rules in favor of industry).
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after roughly thirty cases (minimum sample size used in many statistical analyses 58),
each arbitrator's case record arguably should be generally representative of the
population of employment awards. One could in theory then begin to develop a
decision rule for excluding arbitrators. A possible rule would be to use some
distance from the mean. For example, in a normal distribution, the means of the
majority of the samples would all fall within a standard deviation from the mean of
the population. 9
However, the sample size of thirty would present an obstacle to evaluating most
newer arbitrators, as it is not uncommon for a newer arbitrator to get only a handful
of cases a year. Moreover, FMCS statistics indicate that half of all its labor
arbitrators have fewer than five cases each year.' Thus, this approach presents
practical problems in accumulating sufficient sample size for many arbitrators.
Another problem with this approach is the assumption that each arbitrator gets
a random sample of the cases from the available population. Since the parties parti-
cipate in selection of the arbitrator, and this process is informed by assessments of
the arbitrator's expertise and experience in particular industries or types of disputes,
some might argue that no single arbitrator's caseload is a random sample of the
population of all employment arbitration awards. This means that differences in
arbitrator track records, even assuming a large enough sample size, may be the
function of systematic differences in caseload produced by the selection process.
Another term we could borrow from statistics is selection bias, meaning the sample
is skewed in some way because it was not randomly selected.
The bottom line is that it is problematic for reviewing courts to use a statistical
approach for determining actual active arbitrator bias. It is not possible as a
practical matter to determine whether a given arbitrator is ruling statistically signi-
ficantly more often for one side than the average arbitrator, given the current state
of confidentiality for awards, and the lack of public record-keeping. It is also risky
as a matter of fundamental fairness if no arbitrator's caseload is random, since one
can not determine statistically whether that arbitrator's track record has departed
from the mean because of arbitral bias or because of some selection bias in the
nature of the cases referred to that arbitrator. Of course, the fact that this approach
may be inappropriate for reviewing courts does not mean it is inappropriate for the
parties themselves in selecting arbitrators; after all, advocates have always done just
58. CHESThR L. OLSON, STATISTICS: MAKtNG SENSE OF DATA 302-03 (1987) (stating that the generally
accepted rule of thumb for the Central Limit Theorem is that, for almost any population distribution likely to be
encountered in practice, a sample size of n=30 is apt to be large enough to apply the results of the Central Limit
Theorem with reasonable accuracy).
59. OLSON, supra note 58, at 126-27 (In symmetric, unimodal distributions, approximately 68% ofall obser-
vations fall within one standard deviation above and below the mean, and approximately 95% of all observations
fall within two standard deviations above and below the mean).
60. Memorandum from the Office of Arbitration Services, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service,
United States Government, to FMCS Roster of Arbitrators (Apr. 28, 1995) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
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this in arbitration, if not with mathematical precision, then at least with the exercise
of informed judgment and common sense. A reviewing court risks labeling an
arbitrator and permanently damaging his or her career; the parties themselves are
simply operating as informed consumers in a free market for dispute resolution
services.
B. Individual Arbitrator Passive Partiality or Bias
While there are a number of good reasons for not using a statistical analysis of
an individual arbitrator's overall record to measure active partiality, it may
nevertheless serve as relevant and probative evidence of passive partiality. Most
arbitration statutes permit the reviewing court to vacate an award for "evident
partiality," a standard that the Supreme Court applied under the Federal Arbitration
Act in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co.6' After a
tripartite panel issued an arbitration award ruling for the prime contractor in a
dispute between a prime contractor and subcontractor, the subcontractor learned
that the neutral arbitrator had a business relationship with the prime contractor. It
is both interesting and significant that this business relationship consisted of
repeated, sporadic use of the arbitrator's services, as a consultant not an arbitrator,
which generated fees of approximately $12,000 over a five year period. Arguably,
this relationship is analogous, at least in financial terms, to one between an arbi-
trator and a party where that party selects the arbitrator to handle one to two cases
a year. A majority of the court concluded that this most probably continuing and
undisclosed business relationship constituted evident partiality. The emerging test
suggested by some courts is a reasonable person standard. Specifically, a court will
grant a motion to vacate an award where the undisclosed facts and circumstances
would cause a reasonable person to conclude that the arbitrator is partial to one
party; proof of actual, individual arbitrator bias is unnecessary. 62 The mere
appearance of bias, however, is not sufficient for vacatur; partiality must be direct,
definite, and capable of demonstration, not remote, uncertain or speculative.
63
Professors MacNeil, Speidel and Stipanowich propose that issues of passive bias
be handled with full pre-hearing disclosure and a shifting burden of proof.64 They
propose that the party moving to vacate should have the burden of proving that
certain facts create an "appearance of bias." This would raise a presumption of
evident partiality, and shift the burden of proof to the other party to show that a
reasonable person would conclude that the arbitrator was not evidently partial.
61. 393 U.S. 145, 148 (1968); see MAcNmL, supra note 52, § 28.2.3.
62. See MAcNEil, supra note 52, § 28.2.3.3, citing Morelite Const. Corp. v. New York City Dist. Council
Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying Labor Management Relations Act § 301); see also,
Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 991 F.2d 141, 146 (4th Cir. 1993).
63. Health Serv. Management Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1264 (7th Cir. 1992).
64. MACNEL, supra note 52, § 28.2.3.6.
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The question is whether repeat use of an arbitrator as an arbitrator, not as a
consultant or person rendering other unrelated professional services, ought to be
considered the kind of business relationship that triggers this test. In the labor
arbitration arena, it historically has not been a basis for a claim of evident
partiality.6s Should a party be able to support a motion to vacate an award with
evidence that the other party is a repeat player making repeat use of an arbitrator?
In employment arbitration, where the arbitrator has failed to disclose this prior use,
the answer probably should be yes. Where the arbitrator has disclosed the prior use,
and the party has failed to object to the arbitrator's appointment, in the interest of
finality of arbitration awards, the answer probably should be no. It is important to
distinguish what aspect of the arbitrator's record is relevant to this inquiry. The
issue here is not the arbitrator's record of rulings with respect to all parties falling
into certain categories (for example employers versus employees); the issue is
repeat use by a specific employer of this arbitrator. In this latter context, statistics
may be useful to establish a prima facie case of passive partiality for purposes of
then shifting the burden of proof in a motion to vacate.
Since Commonwealth Coatings, a number of courts have considered repeat
economic contacts of one form or another as relevant evidence on the question of
individual arbitrator passive bias. These repeat economic contacts fall into several
categories: (1) ongoing business relationships between an arbitrator and a party; (2)
past business relationships between an arbitrator and a party; (3) ongoing business
relationships between an arbitrator and a party's counsel; (4) past business relation-
ships between an arbitrator and a party's counsel; and (5) relationships with a wit-
ness for one party. A critical factor is whether the arbitrator has made disclosure of
the relationship before issuing the award. Where the arbitrator has made disclosure,
and the party affected fails to object, the courts will usually find there has been a
waiver of any claim of evident partiality.6 Where there has been a timely objection,
maintained throughout the proceeding, then the issue of evident partiality is at least
preserved for the motion to vacate. Where the arbitrator has failed to make dis-
closure, the courts will inquire more deeply.67
65. See Bridgeport Firefighters Ass'n v. City of Bridgeport, 1996 WL 753093 (Conn. Super. 1996) (holding
that the fact that the neutral interest arbitrator had been selected by the City in a selection process in which both
City and union participated, and had served in three other City cases, was not evident partiality but simply evidence
of greater expertise); Cf. Joseph Krislov, Disclosure Problems ofthe Academic LaborArbitrator, 52 J. DISP. RESOL.
54 (Fall 1997) (noting that the nature ofa relationship between a labor arbitrator and counsel for one party may raise
disclosure issues).
66. See Amer v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 649 N.Y.S.2d 185,233 A.D.2d 321 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1996) (explaining
that an insurance carrier waived claims of bias by continuing with arbitration after learning that a party arbitrator
was a former employer of the other party's lawyer, and was also a disbarred lawyer).
67. See School Dist. ofSpoonerv. Northwest United Educators, 401 N.W.2d 578 (Wis. 1987) (holding that
the arbitrator's failure to disclose past employment with one party, and the fact that the attorney for that party had
been his supervisor, was evident partiality). However, the objecting party cannot attempt to raise the issue in a direct
suit against the arbitrator after the resulting arbitration award has been confirmed. See John St. Leasehold, L.L.C.
v. Brunjes, 650 N.Y.S.2d 649 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (determining that the confirmed award was res judicata as to
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In general, ongoing or repeated business contacts with a party will give rise to
at least an appearance of bias for the neutral arbitrator, prompting further inquiry.
68
Past business contacts generally will not.69 Ongoing or repeated business contacts
with a party's counsel again may give rise to at least an appearance of bias for the
neutral arbitrator, again prompting further inquiry.70 Past business contacts with
issues of arbitrator bias based on the fact attorney for one party was arbitrator's attorney in a personal matter).
68. See, e.g., Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that the arbitrator was evidently
partial on reasonable impression of bias, where he failed to disclose that his law firm had handled 19 cases over
35 years for parent company of one of the parties; and where the last such case had ended 21 months prior to
arbitration, even though he had no actual knowledge of the representation); Morelite Constr. Corp. v. New York
City Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that father-son relationship
between arbitrator andofficer of international union of which party to the arbitration was a local represented evident
partiality warranting vacatur of award); Wages v. Smith Barney Harris Upham & Co., 937 P.2d 715 (Az. Ct. App.
1997) (finding that arbitrator created reasonable impression of partiality when he failed to disclose his prior legal
representation of other claimants against one of the parties' predecessor); Drinane v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 606 N.E.2d 1181 (i1l. 1992) (holding fact that arbitrator, in his capacity as a lawyer in private practice, had
brought suit against the insured of one of the parties, this at least raises a presumption of bias, but in this case, the
presumption was overcome); J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. v. Rytex Corp., 356 N.Y.S.2d 278 (N.Y. 1974) (determining
that two of arbitrators were employed by companies that made sales to one of the parties of about $2.5 million
annually, and one of these arbitrators was his employer's sales manager, was sufficient to create evident partiality);
Richco Structures v. Parkside Village, Inc., 263 N.W.2d 204 (Wis. 1978) (holding arbitrator's undisclosed long-
standing business associations with one of the parties and prior acquaintance with that party's arbitrator constituted
evident partiality). However, a party cannot create disqualifying bias by suing the arbitrator during the pendency
of the arbitration proceeding. See National Football League Players Ass'n v. Office and Prof'l Employees Int'l
Union, Local 2,947 F. Supp. 540 (D.D.C. 1996).
69. See Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673 (7th Cir. 1983) (rejecting motion to set aside
award where neutral arbitrator failed to disclose business relationship with president of one party, his former
supervisor, which relationship had ended 14 years before arbitration, and where that relationship, when both worked
at another company, was distant and impersonal); Reeves Bros., Inc. v. Capital-Mercury Shirt Corp., 962 F. Supp.
408 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that where one party was customer of bank where arbitrator was officer several years
prior to arbitration was not evident partiality where relationship was disclosed, and where arbitrator had no
knowledge of the customer or account); Turner v. Nicholson Properties, Inc., 341 S.E.2d 42 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986)
(finding no evident partiality where arbitrator had served as expert witness for clients of one party's counsel, but
suchrelationship was neithercurrent, continuing, direct, nor substantial); Hanson v. Shim, 1997 WL 516529 (Wash.
App. 1997) (holding that fact that arbitrator had been an associate in one party's law firm 20 years ago was not
evident partiality). But see School Dist. of Spooner v. N.W. United Educators, 401 N.W.2d 578 (Wis. 1987)
(holding that arbitrator's failure to disclose past employment with one party, and fact that attorney for that party
had been his supervisor, was evident partiality).
70. See Ceriale v. Amco Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 4th 500,55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 685 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (finding
that a reasonable impression of bias was created when neutral arbitrator failed to disclose that she represented party
in another arbitration in which counsel of one party was the arbitrator, that she had served as arbitrator in other
cases in which firm was counsel, and that firm had repeatedly referred legal business to her); Britz, Inc.*v. Alfa-
Laval Food & Dairy Co., 34 Cal. App. 4th 1085, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700 (1995) (holding that the trial court must
consider de novo whether undisclosed circumstances including ongoing expert witness relationship between arbit-
rator and counsel for one party created reasonable impression of bias; it cannot merely conduct limited review based
on AAA's denial of motion to remove arbitrator); William C. Vick Constr. Co. v. North Carolina Farm Bureau.,
472 S.E.2d 346 (N.C. App. 1996) (neutral arbitrator's failure to disclose social, business, and professional relation-
ships including referral of business with party's counsel reasonably created appearance of partiality); Burlington
Northern RR Co. v. Tuco Inc., 1997 WL 336314 (Tex. 1997) (holding that arbitrator who failed to disclose
acceptance during pendency of arbitration of substantial referral of legal business from law firm of party arbitrator
demonstrated evident partiality as a matter of law).
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counsel generally will not.71 Contact with a witness will not generally be grounds
for vacating the award for arbitrator partiality. 72 Of course, the dividing line bet-
ween past and ongoing is not always a clear one.73 The mere status of one party as
a major business player in the field generally will not be sufficient to establish
evident partiality. 74
71. See AI-Harbi v. Citibank, N.A., 85 F.3d 680 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding no evident partiality where
arbitrator did not know and therefore failed to disclose fact that his former law firm represented one party on matters
unrelated to the dispute in arbitration, and where arbitrator's sole remaining connection to firm was in certain
receivables); Lifecare Int'l, Inc. v. CD Medical, Inc. 68 F.3d 429 (1 th Cir. 1995) (determining that the arbitrator
failed to disclose dispute with lawyer from same firm that represented one of the parties, where the dispute occurred
18 months prior to arbitration, and this did not create a reasonable impression of partiality to warrant vacatur);
Carina Int'l Shipping Corp. v. Adam Maritime Corp., 961 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding no basis for
vacating award where arbitrator disclosed prior employment as associate in law firm of one party's counsel, where
employment had terminated 10 years before arbitration, although arbitrator also disclosed that he had periodically
referred legal business to the firm because objecting party failed to inquire further regarding nature of referrals);
Ronning v. Citizens Sec. Mut. Ins. Co., 557 N.W.2d 363 (Minn. App. 1996) (determining that a remote and
unrelated attorney-client relationship between the neutral arbitrator and counsel for one of the parties is not a basis
to vacate an arbitration award for evident partiality, citing Safeco Ins. Co. v. Stariha, 346 N.W.2d 663, 666 (Minn.
App. 1984); see also R. Travis Jacobs, Casenote, Arbitrator or Private Investigator: Should the Arbitrator's Duty
to Disclose Include a Duty to Investigate? 1997 J. OF DisP. REsOL 133 (1997).
72. See Apusento Garden (Guam) Inc. v. Superior Ct. (Inland Builders Corp.), 94 F.3d 1346 (9th Cir. 1996)
(determining that the fact that arbitrator failed to disclose relationship with party's expert witness where relationship
consisted of both being limited partners in a real estate partnership did not create an objectively reasonable
impression of bias); Reeves Bros., Inc. v. Capital-Mercury Shirt Corp., 962 F. Supp. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (Sweet,
Arb.) (finding fact that possible witness who did not testify was old and close business associate of arbitrator some
forty years earlier did not constitute evident partiality); United States v. Dist. Council, 941 F. Supp. 349 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (determining arbitrator who failed to disclose that, in private law practice, he represented one party's witness
in a collateral proceeding that produced relevant evidence adverse to the other party did not represent evident
partiality); John E. Reid and Associates, Inc. v. Wicklander-Zulawski and Associates, 627 N.E.2d 348 (I1. App.
1993) (determining fact that attorney/expert witness for one party had past relationship with and helped party select
arbitrator is not evident partiality, where other party ranked arbitrator as its first choice); Freeport Const. Co. v. Star
Forge, Inc., 378 N.E.2d 558 (11. App. 1978) (deciding fact that arbitrator had ongoing business relationship with
subcontractor, a representative of whom served as a witness in arbitration involving general contractor, could create
no reasonable impression of bias unless general contractor could prove a nexus between subcontractor's business
dealings and the arbitration hearing); Artists & Craftsmen Builders, Ltd. v. Schapiro, 648 N.Y.S.2d 550, 232
A.D.2d 265 (N.Y.S. Ct. 1996) (concluding that the fact that the witness sublet space from arbitrator was not
sufficient relationship to demonstrate bias, where disclosure was made, and there was no partnership or referral of
business). Similarly, the fact that the neutral arbitrator is a nonparty witness in a case involving the same law firms
as the pending arbitration does not constitute bias. See Int'l Produce, Inc. v. A/S Rosshavet, 638 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.
1981).
73. Where the neutral arbitrator's employer retained the same law firm that represented one of the parties
over a period of years for seven projects, three of which took place during the same period as the arbitration, but
the arbitrator did not know any of the attorneys personally or professionally, and did not work on or assist any of
her employer's personnel with these projects, there was insufficient evidence to show evident partiality. Unstad v.
Lynx Golf, Inc., 1997 WL 193805 (Minn. App. 1997).
74. See A.S. Seateam v. Texaco Panama, Inc., 1997 WL 256949 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (discussing that the mere
fact that arbitrator took notice that Texaco was a major player in the field and had drafted a time-bar clause does
not call arbitrator's objectivity into question, a absent allegations of an arbitrator's relationship with a party or an
arbitrator's personal or financial interest in the proceeding); Areca, Inc. v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 960 F. Supp.
52 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding mere prominence of one party in the industry insufficient to establish evident
partiality). Similarly, the mere status of one arbitrator as possibly one party's state senator was not evident partiality
since the interest was not direct, definite, or capable of demonstration. Card v. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 933 F. Supp.
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In the absence of a union to represent the employee, the arbitrator can only look
to one party in employment arbitration for referral of future business: the employer.
This distinguishes employment arbitration from labor arbitration, particularly if, as
Cole requires, the employer pays the arbitrator's fee. In this situation, it is hard to
find a reasoned basis to separate employment as an arbitrator from employment as
a consultant, as legal counsel, or as an expert witness. Many commercial and em-
ployment arbitrators perform this service as a means of supplementing their pro-
fessional income as lawyers. The new requirements for fuller disclosure of past
service as an arbitrator in a case involving either of the parties75 suggests a growing
recognition of this reality.
In this context, a particular arbitrator's track record as a neutral arbitrator in
cases involving one of the parties can provide evidence on the question of evident
partiality. If the arbitrator fails to disclose this particular form of intermittent
business contact, it should provide evidence as part of a prima facie case of passive
partiality, shifting the burden of proving the arbitrator was in fact impartial to the
party resisting the motion to vacate. If the arbitrator discloses the track record and
a party objects to that arbitrator's service before an award is issued, it is in the best
interests of the employment dispute resolution community for third party adminis-
trators to remove the arbitrator and proceed with selecting a new neutral for the
case. If the affected party fails to object to the arbitrator's service after disclosure,
the question of evident partiality should be deemed waived, in the interest of the
finality of arbitration awards. For purposes of determining whether there is a
reasonable impression of evident partiality, a simple arithmetic report of the cases
and outcomes should be sufficient evidence, since it is comparable to evidence the
courts have already used with respect to ongoing business relationships; sophis-
ticated statistical analysis is not necessary.
The mere status of one party as a prominent player or potential repeat player,
however, should not be sufficient in and of itself. First, were that the rule, we could
arbitrate nothing, since in every case one party is likely to have more economic
power in the relevant industry than another. Second, a rule that status alone cannot
establish bias is consistent with the case law. Third, this rule is also supported by
the repeat player data. In both the study reported here, and an earlier study,76 em-
ployers were categorized based on whether they appeared in the case pool more
than one time. If so, they were considered repeat players. While data analysis of
repeat player outcomes indicated that this group of employers did better in em-
ployment arbitration, notably the one-shot employers did not. Thus, consistent with
judicial precedent recognizing that actual, ongoing or repeated economic or
business contacts can create a reasonable impression of bias, but the mere potential
806 (D. Minn. 1996).
75. See generally NAT'L RULES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES. supra note 20.
76. Lisa B. Binghamn, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMPLOYEE RTs. &
EMPLOYMENTPOL'YJ. 189 (1997).
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for such contact does not, courts examining passive arbitrator bias should look only
to actual repeat use by one party.
C. Structural Bias
Statistical analysis may be useful to explore questions of structural bias
stemming from the nature of the rules governing the arbitration. In this context, the
relevant level of analysis is the relative outcome of employers as a group compared
to employees as a group among the population of all arbitration awards, or a valid
sample of the population, under a given set of arbitration rules or due process
protections. The repeat player problem in employment arbitration might be charac-
terized as a reflection of structural bias predating the Due Process Protocol.
Allison provides a useful framework for analyzing decision-maker bias in the
case of economic conflicts of interest.77 Allison suggests that we value a dispute
resolution process for instrumental and non-instrumental reasons. The instrumental
reasons are because it produces accurate, implementable, fair, and efficiently-
arrived at decisions. 8 Accuracy has two components, positive and normative.79
Positive accuracy involves accurate fact-finding. Normative accuracy involves
correct application of legal or other normative standards or decision principles.
Efficacy is its ability to produce decisions that participants can implement.80
Fairness includes attributes of distributive justice and procedural justice.8'
Efficiency involves achieving all these other goals with the least expenditure of
time, money and other resources.82 The non-instrumental reasons we value a dispute
resolution process include individual dignity, educating the parties, and institutional
legitimacy.
Employment arbitration is an adjudicative, not a legislative process. We hold
adjudicative processes to higher standards of due process and unbiasedness.8
4
Allison suggests we can best understand court administrative law and due process
decisions regarding economic bias by examining them along two dimensions: the
directness of the economic interest, and its substantiality. 85 Courts have tended to
intervene where a decision-maker's economic interest is both direct and substantial,
while they have tended not to intervene where the interest is both indirect and
77. John R. Allison, A Process Value Analysis of Decision-maker Bias: 77e Case of Economic Conflicts
ofInterest. 32 AMER. BUS. UJ. 481 (1995).
78. 1d& at 481, 490-99.
79. IM. at 491-95.
80. let at 495.
81. Id. at 496-97.
82. Id. at 498-99.
83. 1d. at 499-504.
84. Id. at 504-13.
85. Id at 514-17.
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insubstantial.86 Decisions are more variable for direct but insubstantial interests, and
for indirect but substantial interests. Essentially, directness represents the pro-
bability that the decision-maker will receive the economic interest, and this includes
elements of likelihood, timing, and causation.87 Substantiality includes the interest's
value both relative to the economic base of the decision-maker and in absolute
terms. Clearly, in any given case these two concepts of directness and substantiality
will be inextricably interrelated, but they give us a way to talk about and perhaps
parse the magnitude of an economic conflict of interest, and hence, its significance
for questions of decision-maker impartiality.
These dimensions may provide some guidance for evaluating concerns about
structural bias stemming from the repeat player effect. Certain characteristics of
employment arbitration rules might render an arbitrator's economic interest more
direct. In particular, where the employer has effective control over arbitrator
selection, one can argue that the arbitrator's economic interest in repeat business
from that employer is a direct interest because there is a high probability that the
employer can select the arbitrator in the future. An employer may have effective
control over arbitrator selection in several contexts. The employer may unilaterally
designate a single permanent umpire or a small permanent panel. The employer may
name a single, small third party arbitration service provider with a very small list
of neutrals. The employer may have effective control because a person purporting
to speak on behalf of both employer and employee requests a given arbitrator by
name from a large roster, and that arbitrator is in fact appointed to hear the case
whenever requested. Where repeat player employers made repeat use of the same
arbitrator in multiple cases in this study, they won significantly more of the cases.
Courts will reject a process as not representing any form of arbitration when one
party exercises too much control over the supposed neutral.88 For example, where
86. See Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996) (holding that an arbitration clause requiring arbitrators
to be board certified surgeons was not unconscionable as there was no evidence to show that neutrally selected
surgeons would be biased in favor of malpractice defendants, since any perceived pecuniary interest of a physician
in lower malpractice premiums is too tenuous to affect his or her neutrality).
87. For example, where an automobile franchisee agreed to arbitrate under a process where the panel
consisted of two dealers and two manufacturer representatives, the franchisee failed to show arbitrators had per-
sonal, financial stake in the outcome of the case, and the financial relationship was attenuated, in that there was no
evidence thatthepanel would tend to favorthe manufacturer, orbenefit from deciding in its favor. See, e.g., Woods
v. Saturn Dist. Corp., 78 F.3d 424 (9th Cir. 1996). The court also rejected arguments regarding unequal bargaining
power in the franchise agreement. Similarly, in Morris v. Metriyakool, 344 N.W.2d 736 (Mich. 1984), the court
rejected an argument that there was a high probability a medical malpractice arbitration panel consisting of an
attorney, a physician or hospital administrator, and an independent party would rule in favor of health care
providers.
88. See Ditto v. RE/MAX Preferred Properties, 861 P.2d 1000 (Okla. App. 1993) (holding that one party
exercised too much control over selection of the arbitrators where realty company selected all three arbitrators from
pool of its realtors); see also, MAcNEItt, supra note 52, § 28.2.5.2 (citing a growing body of authority supporting
minimal standards of fairness, and citing Bennish v. N.C. Dance Theatre, Inc., 422 S.E.2d 335 (N.C. Ct. App.
1992), wherein the court held that an outside neutral arbitrator must be substituted for one of the Dance Theatre's
two representatives on a three-person panel).
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the neutral is in fact a paid employee of one of the parties, courts have held that the
supposed neutral is not an arbitrator at all. 9
In the foregoing examples, the employer has direct control over arbitrator
selection. However, the employer may exercise some control over arbitrator
selection if it has information upon which to base an arbitrator's selection which the
employee lacks. For example, Kaiser Permanente maintains a database for selection
of arbitrators in medical malpractice cases involving members of its health main-
tenance organization system. Similarly, repeat player employers have certain
strategic advantages in employment arbitration; they have institutional memory.
They can keep records regarding the disposition of prior cases by a certain arbi-
trator. They can make informed selections from a list of arbitrators. Unrepresented
employees lack this reservoir of information; there is nothing in the employment
arbitration process to replace the institutional memory of the repeat player union.
However, in these latter cases, the employer's control is arguably less direct than
in the former cases. The employer may have more information and be able to make
a better arbitrator selection for its purposes, but the employee is nevertheless
participating in the arbitrator's selection.
Cole v. Burns International presents another issue concerning the directness of
the economic interest. The Court held that, for an adhesive employment arbitration
agreement to be enforceable as to statutory claims, the employer must bear the full
expense of the arbitrator's fee. By operation of law, the court has rendered the con-
nection between the employer and the arbitrator's financial self interest more direct.
The employer, in all employment arbitration cases, must pay the arbitrator. One
could argue that this frees the arbitrator to decide the case in favor of the employee,
since the arbitrator is assured of payment in either event. Moreover, the AAA
practice of requiring parties to pay the fee in advance in commercial arbitration may
eliminate any immediate connection between outcome of the case and payment for
the arbitrator." However, the arbitrator is only assured payment by the employer if
the arbitrator is selected to hear the case, an event over which the employer may
have more control than the employee. Thus, these two factors together arguably
amplify the directness of the arbitrator's financial interest.
Since directness is a question of probability, one must consider not only the
employer's control over selection, but also the frequency with which the employer
is likely to exercise that control. This relates to the timing of the arbitrator's eco-
nomic interest, and also to causation. A small employer with relatively few em-
ployees is less likely to have repeat business than a large Fortune 500 Company
89. See Cheng-Canindin v. Renaissance Hotel Assoc., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 867 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (deter-
mining that employer's review committee procedure was not arbitration because there was no third party decision-
maker, and process was controlled exclusively by one party to dispute); see also MAcNEIL, supra note 52, §
28.2.5.2 (citing McConnell v. Howard Univ., 818 F.2d 58 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that a termination procedure
was not arbitration where the decision-maker was one party's board of trustees)).
90. Rau, supra note 52, at 485.
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with numerous employees. Large companies are more likely to be the source of
future business for the arbitrators because they have more employment disputes to
arbitrate.
Dispute resolution service providers can take steps to reduce this directness, or
other factors can render the economic interest less direct. The AAA has amended
its Employment Dispute Resolution Rules to require that arbitrators disclose
whether either party has selected them for a case previously. This rule provides
more information to employees, and may enable them to disqualify arbitrators
whom employers select on a repeat basis. This might reduce the probability that em-
ployers can effectively select the arbitrator they want. However, Professor Rau
notes that narrow disclosure rules do not capture information about the arbitrator's
decisions with respect to other employers, or similar industries, and a broader
disclosure rule may be difficult to implement.91
Providers can take steps to ensure mutual participation in the selection of the
arbitrator to neutralize the effect. Increasing the pool from which arbitrators may
be selected would render economic interest less direct. In addition, the providers
can adopt random assignment of arbitrators to lists. This will reduce the likelihood
of repeat appearance on each list of any single arbitrator. Sending the parties only
a random sample from a large roster of arbitrators will reduce the probability that
an employer may select any one arbitrator on the roster on a repeated basis. The
arbitration service provider could also take selection of the arbitrator entirely out
of the parties' hands.92 Some courts have used the fact that a trial court participated
in arbitration selection as tending to disprove evident partiality.93 This would reduce
directness, but not entirely resolve the problem, for the arbitrator service provider
itself has an interest in repeat business from large institutional players that make
frequent use of arbitration.94
Allison's second dimension is substantiality. Substantiality refers to the relative
and absolute value of the economic interest. For example, a five dollar fee in and
of itself represents an insubstantial economic interest; however, a five dollar fee
charged for each of ten thousand cases over two years may constitute a substantial
91. Id. at525.
92. See id. at 527. In Thomas v. Workmen's Compensation App. Board, 680 A.2d 24 (Pa. Comm. 1996),
the court used the fact that a referee was randomly assigned to hear the case as tending to show there was no bias.
Interestingly, one court considered a clause giving the AAA power to select the arbitrator as limiting the employee's
rhoice, and therefore as one factor to consider in determining whether the arbitration clause was unconscionable,
wheretheclause also excluded otherremedies, eliminated discovery, limited damages, and divided the costs equally
between the parties to the arbitration; see also Pony Express Courier Corp. v. Morris, 921 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. App.
1996).
93. See General Casualty Co. v. Tracer Ind. Inc., 674 N.E.2d 473 (111. App. 1996) (noting that the court
appointed the neutral, so neither party had advantage in selection, and arbitrator was not biased notwithstanding
acquaintance 20 years ago with owner of insurer); Ronning v. Citizens Sec. Mutual Ins. Co., 557 N.W.2d 363
(Minn. App. 1996) (finding no bias where court selected arbitrator on recommendation of other party when first
party defaulted, although arbitrator failed to disclose past relationship).
94. Rau, supra note 52, at 524.
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economic interest.95 In Cole v. Burns, the court expressed concern regarding
arbitrator fees that ranged in amount from $500 to $1,000 per day (parties'
stipulation in the case), and noted that the AAA cites $700 per day as an average
arbitrator's fee, but that some arbitrators charge $500 to $600 per hour.96 Total
arbitrator fees in employment cases range between $1,000 and $3,000. 97 In absolute
terms, this is not an insubstantial amount. Whether it is substantial in relative terms
will depend on the arbitrator's income. For example, for a NAA arbitrator with a
full case load of two hearings per week, or as many as fifty to one hundred cases per
year, any single case fee might be relatively insubstantial. However, for an arbi-
trator with a lower annual income, the fee for any one case might be relatively more
substantial. In any event, this value of the case fee would have to be combined with
the probability of repeat business to develop a sense of the absolute magnitude of
the economic self-interest of the arbitrator.
Prior research supports this analysis, albeit indirectly. The odds of any one
arbitrator getting an employment arbitration case from the American Arbitration
Association's then Commercial Arbitrator Employment roster in 1992 were a little
better than one in one hundred.98 There were, in absolute terms, very few of these
cases, rendering the economic incentive perhaps insubstantial and indirect. There
was no indication of systematic pro-employer structural bias in the 1992 Com-
mercial Employment cases decided under the AAA rules, although that study did
not examine repeat players. It found that overall, employees won most of their
claims, and a greater proportion of what they demanded, than employers won with
respect to their claims. Moreover, in that sample, a number of arbitrators served pro
bono; this was permitted under the Commercial Rules then in effect when the
arbitration hearing lasted only one day. Clearly, in such a circumstance, the
economic interest would be insubstantial.
It is of course not possible to calculate in a mathematical fashion some precise
number representing the risk of structural arbitrator bias. What this analysis does
provide, however, is a series of testable hypotheses for incremental reform.99 One
could, in theory, compare outcomes in one case pool where certain of these pro-
cedural protections are in place with those from another provider's case pool, where
the protections are not in place.
While Allison's framework provides a helpful way to begin to think about
structural bias in employment arbitration, it also raises some important caveats
about what conclusions we can draw from the repeat player data. Accuracy, both
95. Allison, supra note 77, at 530.
96. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
97. Bingham, Is There A Bias In Arbitration Of Non-Union Employment Disputes? An Analysis Of Actual
Cases And Outcomes, supra note 33, at 377; Bingham, Emerging Due Process Concerns in Employment
Arbitration.. A Look at Actual Cases, supra note 36, at 114.
98. Bingham, Is There A Bias In Arbitration Of Non-Union Employment Disputes? An Analysis Of Actual
Cases And Outcomes, supra note 33, at 383.
99. Rau, supra note 52, at 37.
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positive in the sense of correct fact finding, and normative in the sense of correct
application of decision standards, is notoriously hard to measure in any dispute
resolution process. For example, both positive and normative accuracy are likely to
be a function in part of the quality of advocacy in the hearing; that is a premise of
our adversary system. The quality of advocacy will likely vary with the resources
of the parties. Where there is a rough balance of resources, for example, between
highly compensated white collar executives represented by counsel and their former
employers, there is no evidence of systematic pro-employer bias in employment
arbitration outcomes.0" However, cases under the new AAA Employment Dispute
Resolution Rules are more likely to involve repeat player employers and disputes
regarding the termination of blue and pink collar employees, who are less likely to
have legal counsel.01 Even where both parties are represented by counsel, the
quality of that representation is impossible to measure. One cannot lay differences
in the quality of advocacy at the doorstep of the arbitrator, arbitration service pro-
vider, or rules governing the arbitration (assuming these permit representation).
Moreover, we cannot measure absolute normative accuracy. For example, there
are likely to be differences in the strength of a blue or pink collar worker's legal
claim when compared to that of a white collar executive; this is a further reflection
of asymmetry in theirresources. In the absence of a collective bargaining agreement
requiring just cause for discipline, or an individual written contract for a specific
term of employment such as that enjoyed by most white collar workers in the
sample, these workers are employed at will. Their employment may be terminated
with or without cause, provided that there is no prohibited discrimination or other
statutory violation. The outcomes described above may simply reflect this reality.
Most of the awards in the sample follow the commercial arbitration format."'2 This
means that they are one-page awards which contain no discussion of facts or rea-
soning, but simply award or deny damages, and allocate arbitrator fees and adminis-
trative expenses. There was no systematic way from these awards to evaluate the
merits of these cases, nor even to determine in many of the cases what decisional
standard the arbitrator sought to apply. Under recent employment rules changes,
arbitrators are writing labor-style reasoned arbitration awards. Future research will
address the extent to which the decisional standard contributes to outcomes.
The distributive justice of employment arbitration, too, is impossible to measure
in absolute terms. Absent a complete transcript of the evidence, we cannot second
guess in any one case whether an arbitrator reached the correct distributive out-
come, taking into account both positive and normative accuracy. At present, all we
can do is look at the relative distributive justice of employment arbitration. In other
100. Bingham, Is There A Bias In Arbitration Of Non-Union Employment Disputes? An Analysis Of Actual
Cases And Outcomes, supra note 33, at 383.
101. Binghan, Emerging Due Process Concerns in Employment Arbitration: A Look at Actual Cases, supra
note 36, at 116.
102. Rau, supra note 52, at 529-38.
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words, we can only examine systematic patterns in the outcomes in relation to
particular variables of interest, a long-standing and well established method for
doing research on arbitration and other dispute resolution processes. Todor and
Owen argue that such a relative assessment is an important step in evaluating the
process, albeit an incomplete one. 0 3
VI. CONCLUSION
The new uses of commercial arbitration raise important public policy issues.
Repeat player employers have more bargaining power than individual, unrepre-
sented employees. One means of exercising this power is the personnel manual,
employee handbook, or adhesive employment contract. The empirical findings
suggest that this superior bargaining power is affecting the outcomes of arbitration.
Emerging due process standards and policies of self-regulation in dispute resolution
can begin to address this unequal bargaining power. Techniques from social science
can help inform both those who make and those who apply law and public policy
in the field of arbitration. While we should not use statistics to draw conclusions
about active bias on the part of individual arbitrators, we can and should look at
undisclosed arbitral track records with a repeat user party when considering issues
of the reasonable appearance of partiality. Moreover, we should look for possible
structural biases in contracts and rule systems for conducting arbitration by con-
ducting macrojustice assessments on the population of awards issued under those
contracts or systems. Judicial review can operate in partnership with efforts at self-
regulation within the dispute resolution community. Arbitration can provide wide-
spread access to justice for the American workforce if it is properly structured, and
properly supervised.
103. Todor & Owen, supra note 40, at 37-49.

